Published on Jakarta Post, January 28, 2016
Similar to previous terror attacks in Indonesia, the Jan. 14 Jakarta attack left the public with questions, or even fierce criticism, surrounding the role of intelligence. Where was Indonesia's intelligence apparatus? How come counter terrorism agencies failed to prevent the attack 'particularly as it was just a few hundred meters from the Presidential Palace?
The answer is found partially in the Terrorism Law, which regulates counter-terrorism policing, and also in the widely acknowledged challenges of information sharing.
Any type of organization is familiar with problems of coordination, collaboration and the sharing of information, particularly among organizations in an inter-agency framework. For those institutions responsible for secret and sensitive information, the challenges are even larger.
Within Indonesia's intelligence apparatus, the level of information that can be shared in forums is limited. Usually information is shared at the strategic intelligence level and hardly touches tactical or operational levels. Among the causes for this are differences in organizational culture, mode of operation, duties, powers, methodologies, organizational issues, lack of trust in each other and ego-sectorial strive. In addition, a culture of secrecy often leads to the assumption that all intelligence products are intrinsically confidential.
The difficulty of sharing information between units is not unique to Indonesia. In the case of the 2013 Boston marathon bombings, the FBI in Moscow had, two years earlier, received lead information from Russian intelligence service concerning the links of the Tsarnaev brothers with extremists. The FBI did not share this information with the CIA or other authorities. If they had done so, the brothers would have been placed on a watch list and the terror attack may have been avoided.
After the latest terror attack, the head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), Sutiyoso, said information on a terror plot had been submitted to the police. He said the information from BIN was, very often, not followed up by the counterterrorism force, Densus 88. Any information or intelligence obtained from BIN is, by Indonesian law, difficult to use as legal evidence. The purpose of intelligence reports produced by BIN is to inform the President of threats to national security and, thus, differs significantly from what is required by Densus 88. This has resulted in the impression that information and intelligence from BIN is 'useless'.
Densus 88 has two responsibilities. Firstly, to thwart terrorist attacks, they must be able to act preemptively and secondly, they are also required to gather evidence that will be accepted in a court room. Unfortunately, as others have said, the anti-terrorism law does not provide any provision on preventive actions by the police, Densus 88 can only resort to the Criminal Code that clearly matches poorly with a concrete terror threat.
To remain consistent with the principles of democracy, an intelligence agency like BIN cannot hold enforcement powers, such as the right to arrest or detain. The authority to do this must be in the hands of law enforcers who strictly abide by the law and only take action when a criminal offense is committed. Thus, BIN can only give warning of planned attacks. Meanwhile Densus 88 cannot follow up intelligence from BIN, as the information must be acceptable as evidence in court. This is a gray area in Indonesian law that needs to be repaired.
In the media and the community at large, an imbalanced picture is given on the relationship between BIN and Densus 88. We cannot simply blame Densus 88 or BIN for failing to prevent an act of terrorism.
Generally, obtaining good intelligence is seen as a vital key to prevent and thwart terrorism. It is, therefore, essential to invest in measures to strengthen the inter-agency coordination and information sharing mechanisms, for example, through shared training sessions and, on suitable occasions, shared operation. The government is rightly considering legal instruments including revising the anti-terror law.
The writer, a lecturer at the criminal law department at the Faculty of Law, Airlangga University in Surabaya, is conducting a PhD dissertation on the use of intelligence in Indonesian counter-terrorism policing at the School of Law, University of Washington.
Printed version
Similar to previous terror attacks in Indonesia, the Jan. 14 Jakarta attack left the public with questions, or even fierce criticism, surrounding the role of intelligence. Where was Indonesia's intelligence apparatus? How come counter terrorism agencies failed to prevent the attack 'particularly as it was just a few hundred meters from the Presidential Palace?
The answer is found partially in the Terrorism Law, which regulates counter-terrorism policing, and also in the widely acknowledged challenges of information sharing.
Any type of organization is familiar with problems of coordination, collaboration and the sharing of information, particularly among organizations in an inter-agency framework. For those institutions responsible for secret and sensitive information, the challenges are even larger.
Within Indonesia's intelligence apparatus, the level of information that can be shared in forums is limited. Usually information is shared at the strategic intelligence level and hardly touches tactical or operational levels. Among the causes for this are differences in organizational culture, mode of operation, duties, powers, methodologies, organizational issues, lack of trust in each other and ego-sectorial strive. In addition, a culture of secrecy often leads to the assumption that all intelligence products are intrinsically confidential.
The difficulty of sharing information between units is not unique to Indonesia. In the case of the 2013 Boston marathon bombings, the FBI in Moscow had, two years earlier, received lead information from Russian intelligence service concerning the links of the Tsarnaev brothers with extremists. The FBI did not share this information with the CIA or other authorities. If they had done so, the brothers would have been placed on a watch list and the terror attack may have been avoided.
After the latest terror attack, the head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), Sutiyoso, said information on a terror plot had been submitted to the police. He said the information from BIN was, very often, not followed up by the counterterrorism force, Densus 88. Any information or intelligence obtained from BIN is, by Indonesian law, difficult to use as legal evidence. The purpose of intelligence reports produced by BIN is to inform the President of threats to national security and, thus, differs significantly from what is required by Densus 88. This has resulted in the impression that information and intelligence from BIN is 'useless'.
Densus 88 has two responsibilities. Firstly, to thwart terrorist attacks, they must be able to act preemptively and secondly, they are also required to gather evidence that will be accepted in a court room. Unfortunately, as others have said, the anti-terrorism law does not provide any provision on preventive actions by the police, Densus 88 can only resort to the Criminal Code that clearly matches poorly with a concrete terror threat.
To remain consistent with the principles of democracy, an intelligence agency like BIN cannot hold enforcement powers, such as the right to arrest or detain. The authority to do this must be in the hands of law enforcers who strictly abide by the law and only take action when a criminal offense is committed. Thus, BIN can only give warning of planned attacks. Meanwhile Densus 88 cannot follow up intelligence from BIN, as the information must be acceptable as evidence in court. This is a gray area in Indonesian law that needs to be repaired.
In the media and the community at large, an imbalanced picture is given on the relationship between BIN and Densus 88. We cannot simply blame Densus 88 or BIN for failing to prevent an act of terrorism.
Generally, obtaining good intelligence is seen as a vital key to prevent and thwart terrorism. It is, therefore, essential to invest in measures to strengthen the inter-agency coordination and information sharing mechanisms, for example, through shared training sessions and, on suitable occasions, shared operation. The government is rightly considering legal instruments including revising the anti-terror law.
The writer, a lecturer at the criminal law department at the Faculty of Law, Airlangga University in Surabaya, is conducting a PhD dissertation on the use of intelligence in Indonesian counter-terrorism policing at the School of Law, University of Washington.
Printed version
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