Santoso, Indonesia’s most wanted terrorist, has been shot dead under the banner of Tinombala operation. This joint counterterrorism operation between police and Indonesian Military (TNI) to hunt Santoso has been going on for some time. Last year, for example, the police force led by Densus 88 and Mobile Brigade (Brimob), had conducted a series of missions in Poso. The police force required military personnel to fulfill a larger role in the chase process.
The triumph to hunt down Santoso and his group is the “success story” highlighting cooperation between police and TNI, as well as the TNI’s involvement in counter-terrorism. In the same time, The House of Representatives (DPR) and government are discussing the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law. The government is insisting to include the role of TNI in the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law. Whilst, the Indonesian lawmakers, human rights activists and the public in general are, due to the history of abuses during the New Order era, suspicious of any indication of the military taking on a greater role in post-Suharto Indonesia.
The question then arises should it be or shouldn’t it be included in the revision of Anti-Terrorism Law? Why it is justified and unjustified in the context of Indonesia?
Current legal context of TNI involvement in counter-terrorism (CT)
Worldwide it is common practice to involve the military in CT operations even if a country has adopted the criminal justice model for CT. In this sense, the military involvement remains limited only to support and assist police forces. In the Netherlands, for example, a Special Support Units consisting of highly trained specialized Dutch Military Forces is at the disposal for police operations, for example to arrest extremely dangerous violent suspects of terrorism and other crimes.
During such CT operation the police calls in the army unit for assistance but remains leading in the chase and decides about timing and location of the arrest. The arrest team, however, will contain war-equipped soldiers of the Special Support Unit. As soon as the arrest is completed, the captured suspect is handed over to police and the army unit returns to barracks.
Back to Indonesian context, TNI's involvement in CT operation has been drawn and legally justified in the 2004 TNI Law which states the military force could be involved in non-military operations including CT operations. Hence, the role of TNI in CT operations does not need to be included in the Anti-Terrorism Law, which actually clearly and unambiguously holds police forces responsible for CT.
Including a role for TNI in the Anti-Terrorism Law will trigger friction and is vulnerable for being misused/misinterpreted regarding the army’s role and responsibility. It will open a door to extend TNI’s influence in society as actor by flexible usage of the label ‘terrorism’. CT operations can easily be turned from criminal justice to a ‘political war-like’ model.
Reflecting to ‘the success story’ in hunting down Santoso and his group, the cooperation between police and TNI showed that the involvement of TNI in CT is running on a right track. The police force has proactively requested for more assistance from the TNI. To strengthen the police forces, TNI offered to provide trained personnel and specialized equipment. TNI limited its role to providing support to the law enforcement for a particular situation where the regular means of force available to the police were not sufficient.
Therefore, what is needed for Indonesia, basically, is to establish a detailed legal system, including mechanisms, operational procedures and review systems for the deployment of military in a framework of assisting and supporting police forces in CT operations. The mechanics of police-military cooperation must be clearly outlined in order to ensure operational efficiency and effectiveness in the field.
Proactive Counter-terrorism
In conclusion, it is important to note that in Indonesia there currently is a growing focus on proactive CT which is aimed to prevent terrorism. This has implications for the institutions involved, for example in the areas of criminal justice, criminal law and intelligence.
In the area of criminal justice, the implication is for more intelligence-led policing, conducting early arrests to disrupt plots, thwarting terrorist plots before they expand too far, increasing the use of informers, whilst the agents dedicate their energies intensively to baring terrorists before they execute terror plans. In the area of intelligence, it means widening surveillance nets, increased use of profiling, increasing focus on radicalization to violence and counter-radicalization, and increased focus on terrorist financing and fund-raising. In the area of criminal law, the implication is in criminalizing more acts such as speech offences (hate speech) and offences aimed at recruitment and training or membership of organizations.
A more proactive approach requires coordination and integration across a wide range of policy domains such as criminal law, policing, intelligence, finance, border control, immigration, prison. Hence, in regard to the discussion on the revision of Anti-Terrorism Law, it is more important to evaluate and to enhance areas which are most affected by the growing importance of proactive CT rather than “enforce” the idea of a larger role for the military.
The triumph to hunt down Santoso and his group is the “success story” highlighting cooperation between police and TNI, as well as the TNI’s involvement in counter-terrorism. In the same time, The House of Representatives (DPR) and government are discussing the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law. The government is insisting to include the role of TNI in the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law. Whilst, the Indonesian lawmakers, human rights activists and the public in general are, due to the history of abuses during the New Order era, suspicious of any indication of the military taking on a greater role in post-Suharto Indonesia.
The question then arises should it be or shouldn’t it be included in the revision of Anti-Terrorism Law? Why it is justified and unjustified in the context of Indonesia?
Current legal context of TNI involvement in counter-terrorism (CT)
Worldwide it is common practice to involve the military in CT operations even if a country has adopted the criminal justice model for CT. In this sense, the military involvement remains limited only to support and assist police forces. In the Netherlands, for example, a Special Support Units consisting of highly trained specialized Dutch Military Forces is at the disposal for police operations, for example to arrest extremely dangerous violent suspects of terrorism and other crimes.
During such CT operation the police calls in the army unit for assistance but remains leading in the chase and decides about timing and location of the arrest. The arrest team, however, will contain war-equipped soldiers of the Special Support Unit. As soon as the arrest is completed, the captured suspect is handed over to police and the army unit returns to barracks.
Back to Indonesian context, TNI's involvement in CT operation has been drawn and legally justified in the 2004 TNI Law which states the military force could be involved in non-military operations including CT operations. Hence, the role of TNI in CT operations does not need to be included in the Anti-Terrorism Law, which actually clearly and unambiguously holds police forces responsible for CT.
Including a role for TNI in the Anti-Terrorism Law will trigger friction and is vulnerable for being misused/misinterpreted regarding the army’s role and responsibility. It will open a door to extend TNI’s influence in society as actor by flexible usage of the label ‘terrorism’. CT operations can easily be turned from criminal justice to a ‘political war-like’ model.
Reflecting to ‘the success story’ in hunting down Santoso and his group, the cooperation between police and TNI showed that the involvement of TNI in CT is running on a right track. The police force has proactively requested for more assistance from the TNI. To strengthen the police forces, TNI offered to provide trained personnel and specialized equipment. TNI limited its role to providing support to the law enforcement for a particular situation where the regular means of force available to the police were not sufficient.
Therefore, what is needed for Indonesia, basically, is to establish a detailed legal system, including mechanisms, operational procedures and review systems for the deployment of military in a framework of assisting and supporting police forces in CT operations. The mechanics of police-military cooperation must be clearly outlined in order to ensure operational efficiency and effectiveness in the field.
Proactive Counter-terrorism
In conclusion, it is important to note that in Indonesia there currently is a growing focus on proactive CT which is aimed to prevent terrorism. This has implications for the institutions involved, for example in the areas of criminal justice, criminal law and intelligence.
In the area of criminal justice, the implication is for more intelligence-led policing, conducting early arrests to disrupt plots, thwarting terrorist plots before they expand too far, increasing the use of informers, whilst the agents dedicate their energies intensively to baring terrorists before they execute terror plans. In the area of intelligence, it means widening surveillance nets, increased use of profiling, increasing focus on radicalization to violence and counter-radicalization, and increased focus on terrorist financing and fund-raising. In the area of criminal law, the implication is in criminalizing more acts such as speech offences (hate speech) and offences aimed at recruitment and training or membership of organizations.
A more proactive approach requires coordination and integration across a wide range of policy domains such as criminal law, policing, intelligence, finance, border control, immigration, prison. Hence, in regard to the discussion on the revision of Anti-Terrorism Law, it is more important to evaluate and to enhance areas which are most affected by the growing importance of proactive CT rather than “enforce” the idea of a larger role for the military.
Writer:
Amira Paripurna
Ph.D. in law Candidate, School of Law, University of Washington, USA
Lecturer in Criminal Law Department, Faculty of Law, Airlangga University Surabaya
She is currently performing research dissertation on “the use of intelligence in Indonesian counter-terrorism policing”
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